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less expense to the reader. The work could then have borne the more accurate, 
although less rhetorical title, The Growth of the German Physical Community, 
1800-1925. 
Philosophic als Analysis: Studien zur Entwicklung philosophischer Analysiskon- 
zeptionen unter den Einfluss mathematischer Methoden-Modelle im 17. und 
friihen lg. Jahrhundert. By Hans-Jurgen Engfer. Forschungen und Mate- 
rialien zur deutschen Aufklarung (Series 2, Vol. 1). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 
(Fromman-Holzboog). 1982. 293 pp. $50.00. 
Reviewed by Ronald Calinger 
Department of History, The Catholic Uniuersity of America, Washington, D.C. 20064 
Hans-Jtirgen Engfer investigates the influence of the methods of mathematics 
upon (1) the continental European analytical tradition within rationalism during 
the 17th and early 18th centuries and (2) the German Auj7&rung during the second 
half of the 18th century. The section on the earlier period examines the method- 
ologies of Descartes, Leibniz, and Wolff. The late AujUrung section examines 
three prize competitions on methodology sponsored by the Berlin Academy of 
Sciences (1763, 1805, and 1809) and the emergence of the “critical” philosophy of 
Kant. 
Engfer’s topic is central to understanding the Enlightenment, in which reason 
was considered the key to method, and mathematics provided for many the ideal 
for reasoning- Mathematics had its own methods of synthesis and analysis. During 
the Enlightenment, “synthesis” referred to Euclid’s axiomatic method, and 
“analysis” largely referred to symbolic algebra and the new infinitesimal calculus. 
Because of its chronological limits, this book obviously does not deal with the 
mature stage of mathematical analysis of Cauchy, Weierstrass, Dedekind, and 
Cantor. 
This book begins in reverse chronological order with the Berlin Academy of 
Sciences’ prize competition on methodology in 1763. The question posed was 
whether metaphysical truths can be established with the same degree of certainty 
as those of geometry. The philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, who is known as the 
“German Socrates,” won the prize. His paper asserted that the proper method for 
a complete system of truths “is not the synthetic . . . but the analytic.” Im- 
manuel Kant agreed in his prize paper the next year and began to distinguish 
between the methods of mathematics and of metaphysics. Kant corresponded 
with Johann Lambert on these matters. An intense period of reform of analytic 
concepts and methods followed. Concern with analytic methods in philosophy 
remained central at the Berlin Academy through its prize competitions on the 
subject in 1805 and 1809. 
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Within this context, Kant moved toward his “critical” philosophy whose meth- 
odology was intended to assure clarity and to secure certain knowledge in 
metaphysics, the summit of philosophy. His attempt to find a “true middle way” 
between dogmatism and skepticism drew upon aesthetics and formal logic as well 
as mathematical methods. He rejected the theoretical excesses of the Wolffians 
but accepted neither the critical empiricism nor the instrumentalist conservatism 
of Newton as the basis for a method for metaphysics. Still, for Kant, Newtonian 
physics constituted the most dependable theoretical knowledge. Since concepts 
with empirical instances occur in space and time, Kant developed a theory of 
space and time. During the two decades preceding the Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781), he concluded that space and time are pure intuitions and depicted geomet- 
ric truths as being synthetic a priori in nature. Three sources for this characteriza- 
tion of mathematics were Euclid’s Elements, Newton’s Principia, and Wolff’s 
synthetic method model. 
Geometric methods, however, were insufficient to build the analytical methods 
for Kant’s “critical” philosophy. The Critique of Pure Reason removed mathe- 
matics from the leading place it held in methodological discussions in rationalism 
during the prior two centuries. Engfer does not go beyond the Critique to The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Science (1786), where Kant places a contingent 
limit upon the application of mathematics depending upon the level of its develop- 
ment. 
Chapter 2 describes five mathematical models considered in continental En- 
lightenment efforts to improve rational methods in philosophy. Model A was the 
axiomatic method of Euclid’s Elements with its proof theory based upon defini- 
tions, axioms, postulates, and consistent logical inference. Method B was the 
analytic method of Greek geometry from Apollonios and especially the Collection 
of Pappos with indirect proofs that led to new discoveries. Model C, the demon- 
strative regressus, stemmed from Aristotle and Pappas. It pursued circular onto- 
logical relations moving from cause (prior) to effect (posterior) and back. The 
demonstrative regressus had played a role in the discussion of proper scientific 
methodology from Oxford in the 13th century through Padua in the 15th and 16th 
centuries. The Paduan Aristotelian Jacopo Zabarella influenced the demonstration 
theory of Galileo, who asserted the mathematical structure of nature. Engfer 
might have added that this influence of Zabarella occurred through the Jesuit 
teacher Paulus Valla. Zabarella believed that the axiomatic method of geometry 
offered the most powerful demonstrations. Engfer also notes Newton’s appeal to 
the regressus method in the Principia Mathematics (1687) and his paraphrase of it 
in Query 31 of the Opticks (4th ed., 1730). 
Model D was the new species of analysis that arose out of symbolic algebra, and 
model E was the older combinatorial analysis of Raymond Lull with analogies 
from the Cabala. Both of these varieties of analysis were considered in discus- 
sions of logic and epistemology. Engfer describes the new algebra in Vi&e’s 
Zsagoge (1591) and proceeds through the merging of geometry and algebra in the 
analytic geometry of Descartes and Fermat. Next come the inventions and articu- 
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lation of the differential and integral calculus. Engfer follows 18th-century par- 
lance by applying the term “analysis” to both algebra and the calculus. He ac- 
knowledges Leonhard Euler’s role in demonstrating the power of the infinitesimal 
calculus in the Mechanicu (1736) but neglects both his and Lagrange’s work at the 
Berlin Academy. Yet they were the foremost mathematicians of the Enlighten- 
ment. One final point is that by the late 18th century, Condillac employed the 
analytic method rather than the synthetic as the basis for scientific method. 
Chapter 3 turns to the methodological investigations of Descartes. Descartes 
sought a general, deductive methodology that would enable him to attain in philos- 
ophy the clarity and certainty of theoretical geometry. A syllogistic synthesis of 
models A, B, D, and E occurs in the general formulation of Descartes’ new 
analytical method in the Regulue (1628) and the seminal Discourse un Method 
(1637). The Meditutions (1641) posits parallels between the pursuit of knowledge 
of God as clear truth and the pursuit of physical truths, and the Principles (1644) 
seeks to establish physics as an a priori science. These writings reveal a program- 
matic search for a muthesis universulis. Descartes presents the method of analysis 
as the method of discovery, and synthesis as the method of proof. Engfer also 
examines Cartesian doubt, which lies at the heart of Descartes’ method, empirical 
elements in Cartesian science, and the search for first principles. 
Chapter 4 covers “the mathematics, metaphysics and method of Leibniz,” 
which are distinguished from those of Descartes. Leibniz emphasizes that the 
order and beauty of the universe stem from the mathematical planning of God. 
Mathematics provided both basic methods and an ontological structuring princi- 
ple. With that mathematical vision, Leibniz searches for a unified scientiu gene- 
rulis and an ars inueniendi. Both arithmetic and Lull’s combinatorics (model E), 
with its well-delineated logical relationships, exerted an early and continuing 
influence upon Leibniz. His philosophy is grounded in a logical-metaphysical 
theory of relations. Unlike Descartes, he identifies the synthetic method with the 
urs inueniendi in his logic. 
Leibniz’s theories of comprehension and judgment as well as his epistemology 
are examined here. He disagreed with the Cartesian view of clear and certain 
knowledge. Leibniz’s careful study of proofs, including reductions from models A 
and B, and considerations of the context of knowledge led him to conclude that 
proofs building upon subject-predicate analysis and identities are contingent. 
Human proofs fall short of complete truths. Only God with His infinite analysis 
can achieve these. 
Leibniz’s doctrine required a novel epistemology. As his reflexive Monudulogy 
(1714) explains, his epistemology centers on the ontological relation between the 
elemental part and the whole. Active, windowless monads were primary sub- 
stance. Leibniz rejected passive, impenetrable atoms. A preestablished (by divine 
fiat) harmony between mind and matter guaranteed their perfect coordination. 
The monads, which mirrored the universe, were animate, and they perceived with 
differing degrees of clarity. 
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Chapter 5 investigates the evolution of synthetic and analytic methods in the 
writings of Christian Wolff. Wolff, who closely followed the development of the 
calculus by 1700, examined early in his career the axiomatic method of Euclid, in 
part through the writings of Tschimhaus. His Latin Logik (1728) investigated the 
indemonstrable nature of axioms and postulates, and stressed the importance of 
precise definitions as a basis for clarity. Definitions were to be drawn out of 
experience. Wolff found that Euclid’s proofs rested on intuitive insights as well as 
logic. At this stage, he sought to reduce mathematical method to logic and have it 
be prior to other parts of philosophy. 
While the Euclidean model provided the basis for demonstration, algebra and 
the differential calculus were to lead to an urs inueniendi generulis. After his 
Euclidean period, Wolff pursued a symbolic language for the latter and saw the 
heuristic advantage of combinations and variations of these symbols. However, 
he did not draw upon model E, as had Leibniz. In his Psychologiu empiricu 
(1732), Wolff sought to combine the methods of synthesis and analysis into a 
mutually transforming urs churucteristicu cornbinatoria as a means to discover 
truths and errors. 
Wolff, whose followers dominated philosophy in German lands during the mid- 
18th century, systematized and modified Leibniz’s thought. Engfer explains the 
differences between their theories of comprehension and judgment. Most notably, 
the steps in Leibniz’s analysis for complete comprehension seldom reached an 
end, while Wolff reached adequate or complete comprehension when he dis- 
cerned clear and distinct knowledge of a thing from a number of its features. 
Engfer’s interpretation of the varying degrees of influence of five mathematical 
models (A through E) upon the different analytical methods in Enlightenment 
philosophy is sound. It offers a more comprehensive perspective than earlier 
studies by H. Arndt, E. de Angelis, J. Hintikka, G. Tonnehi, and H. Vleeschauer 
that considered the influence of geometry upon philosophy. In addition, it sheds 
new light upon the variety of distinct methods in the AufWirmg analytic tradition 
prior to Kant, including those of Wolff later in his career. Philosophers, historians 
of mathematics and of modem science, intellectual historians, and mathemati- 
cians interested in foundations all should find this book of interest. 
